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MakinG 
The European Union has a crucial role to play in the coming weeks and months in order to consolidate the transition to 
democracy in Tunisia and Egypt, as well as in other 
Arab Mediterranean countries such as Libya and 
hopefully Syria in the near future.
A commitment to promoting reform lies at the 
very heart of the European Neighbourhood Policy 
(ENP). The EU is thus equipped to activate a num-
ber of existing instruments designed to facilitate 
reforms. In 2002, the EU member states made 
clear that the ENP aimed at promoting “demcrat-
ic and economic reforms in its neighborhood.”1
The European Commission also indicated in 
2003 that “in return for concrete progress demon-
strating shared values and effective implementation 
of political, economic and institutional reforms … 
the EU’s neighbourhood should benefit from the 
prospect of closer economic integration with the 
EU.”2 In 2011, the strategy has been reoriented by
two important joint communications of the Europe- 
an Commission and the high representative of the 
Union for foreign affairs and security policy.
Partnership for democracy and prosperity
The joint communication of the European Com-
mission and the high representative on a “Partner-
ship for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with 
the Southern Mediterranean”3 was adopted on 
March 8, 2011, and one titled “A New Response to 
the Changing Neighborhood”4 on May 25, 2011. 
Both have refocused the ENP on the support for 
democratic transition.
In the long term, the new partnership in the 
Southern Mediterranean is to be built on: 
• democratic transformation and institution-
building (fundamental freedoms, constitu-
tional reforms, reform of the judiciary, fight 
against corruption); 
• a stronger partnership with the people (civil 
society, people-to-people actions, youth); 
• sustainable and inclusive growth and eco-
nomic development (small- and medium-
sized enterprisess, vocational/ educational 
training, health, education systems, poorer 
regions), 
whereas the second Communication on the ENP 
as a whole (East and South) aims for: 
• greater support to partners engaged in 
building deep democracy; 
• support for inclusive economic development; 
• strengthening of the two regional dimen-
sions of the European Neighbourhood Policy 
(Eastern Partnership and the Southern 
Mediterranean); 
• mechanisms and instruments fit to deliver 
these objectives.
The two communications are of course 
complementary, the first one being a direct reac-
tion to the 2011 events in Tunisia, Egypt and 
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Tunisian women show their inked 
fingers after voting in Ettadhamen, 
a working class part of Tunis, on 
October 23, 2011. Voter turnout 
in Tunisia’s first-ever democratic 
election was high.
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Libya, whereas the second, on the revision of the 
ENP, was planned since the launching of the ENP in 
2002/2003 and encompasses Eastern Europe and the 
Southern Mediterranean.
All in all, the strategy has been refocused on “demo-
cratic transition” in the Southern Mediterranean. A 
reinforced “differentiated approach” is also expected 
as the new partnership will be based on “concrete 
progress” regarding “democracy, human rights, 
social justice, good governance and the rule of law.” 
The focus will be more on “democratic transforma-
tion” rather than on the broader “political reforms” 
mentioned by the communications of 2003 and 2004. 
The main new instruments are to be found in the field 
of the support to civil society. Indeed, a Civil Society 
Facility will be created alongside the establishment of a 
European Endowment for Democracy to “help political 
parties, non-registered NGos and trade unions and 
other social partners.”
The main issue today is the lack of new EU fund-
ing. This will remain so until the end of the negotia-
tions regarding the future EU financial perspectives. 
Everything is thus about refocusing and reorient-
ing the funds available within the framework of the 
current financial envelope, or aid package, of the 
European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instru-
ment (ENPI).
The Spring programme
The Spring programme (Support to Partnership, 
Reform and Inclusive Growth) adopted on September 
27, 2011, therefore aims to respond to the “pressing 
socio-economic challenges that partner countries of the 
southern Mediterranean region are facing and to
support them in their transition to democracy” on the
basis of the current financial envelope. Thus, the in-
troduction of the “more for more” principle, meaning 
that “the more a country progresses in its democratic 
reforms and institutional building, the more support it 
can expect from the Spring programme.” A total of
65 million euros were committed in 2011 and 285 mil-
lion euros in 2012 for a grand total of 350 million 
EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton, left, and European 
Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood 
Policy Štefan Füle are welcomed to Tunis by Tunisian Foreign 
Affairs Minister Mohamed Mouldi Kefi, right, in September 2011.
Egyptians line up to vote in Cairo in 
March 2011 on a referendum on consti-
tutional changes following the ouster of 
President Hosni Mubarak.
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euros from the ENPI.5 other sources of financ-
ing, such as the resources of the European 
Investment Bank, are therefore crucial.6
Observing and assisting elections
Catherine Ashton and Štefan Füle indicated that 
the EU was ready to provide immediate assistance 
to prepare and organize the electoral processes in 
Tunisia7 and Egypt.8 An impressive EU electoral 
observation mission was created for the Tunisian 
elections,9 whereas Egypt was more reluctant to 
accept such supervision.10
The attitude adopted by the EU after 
Hamas’ electoral victory in the Gaza Strip in 
2006 was generally not well perceived in the 
Arab world. For instance, many observers 
accused the EU of using a double standard. 
Whatever the results of the elections will be, as 
long as the latter will be transparent and demo-
cratic, the EU and its member states will have to 
respect the will of the people.
Tunisia’s “privileged partnership”
It will be also important to put the issue of Tuni-
sia’s privileged partnership on the table quickly. 
This is of major importance as it will give a clear 
sign not only to the Tunisians, but also to the 
international community, that the EU is ready 
to support and accompany Tunisia on its way to 
democracy. of course, such a privileged partner-
ship should be dependent upon the achievement 
of a successful democratic transition.
As far as the content of such a privileged 
partnership is concerned, it would be advisable 
to take into account the lessons of the advanced 
status previously granted to Morocco. Up until 
now, this advanced status has been considered, 
on the one hand, as being a positive political sign 
of a strategic choice made by the kingdom, while 
on the other hand, as lacking in real substance 
when compared to the ENP. It could therefore 
be proposed that the privileged partnership is 
considered as a road map for concluding a new 
enhanced neighborhood agreement on the basis 
of Article 8 of the Lisbon Treaty.
An Egyptian girl hands out leaflets outside a polling station in Cairo during 
the country’s first democratically open election, in late 2011.
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New neighborhood agreements
The member states stressed in the European 
Council conclusions of February 4, 2011, that they 
were “committed to a new partnership involv-
ing more effective support in the future.” A new 
agreement, i.e., a new legally binding contrac-
tual relationship signed and ratified with a new 
democratically elected Tunisian government and 
parliament, would certainly be an effective way of 
showcasing EU support.
In this way, there is a need to conclude a new 
neighborhood agreement with Tunisia in order to:
• reinforce the provisions of the political 
chapter (political dialogue notably);
• include a number of new provisions (rule 
of law, cooperation in judicial matters, 
organized crime, fight against racism and 
xenophobia, etc.);
• take stock of the fact that Tunisia completed 
the tariff dismantling process and is now 
willing to conclude an agreement for a Deep 
and Comprehensive Free Trade Area.
The only other Arab Mediterranean country 
with which it would be feasible, from a technical 
point of view, to conclude a new agreement in the 
near future is Morocco. However, clear commit-
ment to consolidate political reforms should be 
considered as a precondition.
The Union for the Mediterranean
obviously, the Union for the Mediterranean in
its restrictive sense (i.e., taking into account the 
new institutions and the six regional programs) 
does not seem, contrary to the ENP, to be the best
instrument to accompany political reforms. First 
of all, most of the multilateral meetings have been 
postponed or canceled, including the summit. 
Second, the co-president, former Egyptian Presi-
dent Hosni Mubarak, has been deposed and no 
longer has legitimacy. Third, the six programs do 
not have a proper political dimension. However, 
the development of 
regional programs 
regarding small- and 
medium-sized enter-
prises and large-scale 
infrastructure projects 
could certainly be of 
great help to consoli-
date transition processes. In any case, there is a 
need to reflect on the future of the Union for the 
Mediterranean.
Conclusion
one should also not forget that the strategy to 
be adopted vis-à-vis Tunisia and Egypt could 
become a model for other countries of the re-
gion where democratic aspirations of the people 
are as huge as they are legitimate. on the one 
hand, it is important for the EU to react quickly 
with appropriate means. on the other hand, it 
is crucial to consolidate a transition to real and 
effective democracy. one of the worst scenarios 
would be to see the emergence of a new “soft 
authoritarian regime.” 
The more a country progresses in its democratic 
reforms and institutional building, the more 
support it can expect from the Spring programme.
An Egyptian woman votes at a parliamentary polling station in Cairo in 
November 2011. It was one of Egypt’s first free elections in decades.
Tunisians demonstrate against violence and 
religious extremism in July 2011 in Tunisia.
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The two key issues in the near term will 
be the implementation of the constitutional 
reforms in Egypt and Tunisia. In this regard, 
dialogue with all components of civil soci-
ety and with all the actors of the Tunisian 
and Egyptian political scenes is of crucial 
importance.A number of EU member states 
possess considerable expertise in the field of 
democratic transition and this should be used 
to help our partners. For the EU, it is time 
to invest in reforms that should lead to full 
democracy.  o
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Tunisians queue to vote 
in Tunis, in the country’s 
first post-revolution 
election on October 
23, 2011. They elected 
an assembly that will 
rewrite the constitution.
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